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Forthcoming, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur (RIDA), October 2014
Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with
International Norms – Part I (making available right)
Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law*
Abstract
This Letter from the U.S. addresses U.S. compliance with its international
obligation to implement the “making available right” set out in art. 8 of the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty. The “umbrella solution” which enabled member states
to protect the “making available to the public of [authors’] works in such a way
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them” through a combination of extant exclusive rights,
notably the distribution right and the public performance right, has not in the U.S.
afforded secure coverage of the full scope of the right. Lower courts have divided
over the application of the distribution right to offers to make works available for
download. The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the public performance right in
ABC v Aereo jeopardized application of that right to on-demand streaming. The
Supreme Court’s reversal in Aereo has narrowed the gap between domestic law
and international norms, but leaves many questions.
In assessing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion on the state of U.S.
compliance with the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right, I focus on four
issues:
a. coverage of a-synchronous transmissions;
b. identification of “the public” and “members of the public” consistently
with their meaning in the WIPO Treaties;
c. interpretation of the public performance right in a way that does not
limit the right to actual transmissions, but instead encompasses offers to
transmit performances of works.
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public
performance and reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such
prerequisite with international norms.
I conclude that the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion alleviates some concerns
about the conformity of U.S. copyright law with international norms, but the limited
*

Thanks to Dr. Rebecca Giblin, June Besek, Jeffrey Cunard, and for research assistance to Taylor Jones, Columbia
Law School class of 2014, and Nell Ethridge, Columbia Law School class of 2015.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539685

scope of the decision allows other shortcomings to persist. Thus, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the reach of the public performance right with respect to:
near-real time individualized digital retransmissions to members of the public of
broadcast content (akin to cable retransmissions);
a-synchronous transmissions to members of the public when the primary value of
the service to its customers is to transmit performances of content the customers
did not themselves store with the service, or regarding which the customers did
not enjoy some possessory relationship to a copy or right to access
Although the Court did not expressly state that the public performance right
encompassed offers to transmit performances as well as actual performances, the logic of
the decision points toward the broader (and internationally harmonious) interpretation.
The majority did not apply a specific “volition” predicate to determine whether a
retransmission service “performs” the content it communicates, but it acknowledged the
possibility that in some instances the end-user might be deemed the “performer.”
The Court has not directly ruled on the following issues:
Whether remote storage services are publicly performing content stored at the
direction of their customers (but the opinion strongly suggests those services are
not publicly performing);
Whether “volition” is a predicate to determine whether a remote storage service
“makes” the consumer-requested copies created and retained on its servers;
Perhaps most importantly, because Aereo concerned only the public performance right,
the Court did not have occasion to address whether the distribution right encompasses
offers to distribute digital copies, or is limited to actual distributions of digital copies. As
a result, the greatest inconsistency between U.S. compliance and its international
obligation to implement the “making available” right remains unremediated.

In the interval following the prior Letter from the U.S., published in the July and October
2008 issues of the RIDA,1 calls for major reform of the 1976 Copyright Act have grown louder
and more detailed,2 but so far no significant copyright legislation has emerged. This Letter from
the U.S. therefore will address only caselaw developments since late 2008. Moreover, I will
1

Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part I, Legislative Developments: Orphan Works, 217 Revue
Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 99 (July 2008); Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw:
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, 218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167 (October 2008).
2
See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 Colum. J. Law & Arts 3 (2013); Pamela Samuelson,
The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175 (2010).
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confine the discussion to the theme of U.S. compliance with its international obligations under
the Berne Convention, the WIPO Internet Treaties (WCT, WPPT) and the TRIPs Accord. Two
issues dominate that inquiry: first, whether the U.S.’ interpretation of the statutory scope of the
distribution and public performance rights properly implements the WCT making available right,
and second, whether the substantial expansion of the fair use exception exceeds the leeway that
the Berne Convention, art. 9(2), WCT art. 10, and TRIPs art. 13 grant to member states to
provide for exceptions and limitations to copyright. The current installment of this Letter from
the U.S. will cover the first issue; the next installment, in a future number of the RIDA, will
address the second.
I.

U.S. implementation of the “making available” right

The “making available” right, as articulated in the WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8 (and the
WPPT arts. 10 and 14), applies to the offering to the public of on-demand access to a work in the
form of a stream or of a download. The WCT text is clear that the right covers the offer of
individualized access to works, not merely their actual communication, because the text specifies
the “making available to the public of [authors’] works in such a way that members of the public
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (emphasis
supplied).3 Because the text does not distinguish between access to digital copies and access to
performances, compliance with the WCT requires a member state to cover both kinds of access
(streaming and downloading), and to cover not only actual transmissions of streams and
downloads, but also the offering to communicate the work as a stream or a download, to
members of the public separated both in space and in time.
3

See, e.g., Sam Ricketson & Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights: The Berne
Convention and Beyond, supra, para. 12.58: “simply offering the work on an undiscriminating basis, so that any
member of the general public may access the work, should come within the scope of the right. . . . It is not
necessary that the offer be accepted: ‘making available’ embraces incipient as well as effected communications.”;
WIPO Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO (2003) at CT-86 (“It had to be
accepted and clarified that this concept [making available] extends not only to the acts that are carried out by the
‘communications’ themselves (that is, to the acts as a result of which a work or object of related rights is, in fact,
made available to the public and the members of the public do not have to do more than, for example, switch on
equipment necessary for its reception), but also to the acts which only consist of making the work accessible to the
public, and in the case of which the members of the public still have to cause the system to make it actually available
to them.”)
The European Union has adopted the WCT art. 8 making available right verbatim, in the 2001 Information Society
Directive, art. 3(1). The Court of Justice of the European Union, in Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine
Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retreiver Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) (Feb. 13, 2014), recently confirmed that the “making
available” right covers potential as well as completed access to works of authorship. See para. 19: "a work is made
available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they
avail themselves of that opportunity" and para. 20: "It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the
main proceedings, the provision of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’
and, therefore, an ‘act of communication’," Accord, S. Von Lewinski & M. M. Walter, “Information Society
Directive” in M.M. Walter & S. Von Lewinski, European Copyright Law, 983, par. 11.3.30-31 (Oxford University
Press, 2010).
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The “umbrella solution” adopted at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that yielded the
WCT and WPPT allows member states to implement the making available right through a
variety of means, including, for example, an all-embracing “making available” right, or a
combination of a public performance right covering streams and a digital distribution right
covering downloads.4 Whatever the means chosen, however, the member state must ensure that
its law covers the offering to the public of on-demand access to a work both as a stream and as a
download.
The U.S. implementation of the making available right reveals the potential shortcomings
of relying on multiple exclusive rights collectively to cover the full range of acts comprised
within the making available right: some features of the right may end up left out. The U.S. has
assigned the offering and communication of digital streams to the public performance right, and
downloads to the reproduction and distribution rights. Implementation of the making available
right through these pre-existing exclusive rights required no amendments to the Copyright Act,
U.S. authorities assured, because the combination of rights sufficed.5 Full coverage of the
making available right through a combination of rights has nonetheless proved elusive in the
U.S.
At the time of ratification, however, U.S. authorities did not anticipate the difficulties that
have subsequently ensued. As a study published in 2013 by the U.S. Department of Commerce
(“Green Paper”) explains,
When the United States implemented the WIPO Internet Treaties in the DMCA, it did not
include an explicit “making available” right, as both Congress and the Administration
concluded that the relevant acts were encompassed within the existing scope of exclusive
rights. In addition to the existing reproduction and public performance rights, the
distribution right, adopted in the 1976 Copyright Act, applied to digital transmissions as
well as the distribution of physical copies. And the legislative history indicates that this
right was intended to incorporate the prior law’s “publication” right, which included the
mere offering of copies to the public.
Since that time, a number of U.S. courts have addressed the “making available” right,
primarily in the context of individuals uploading a work to a shared folder on a computer
connected to a peer-to-peer network. A number of courts have concluded that the
distribution right incorporates the concept of “making available” reflected in the WIPO
Treaties. Some others have disagreed. All of these cases, however, have focused solely
4

The Records of the 1996 diplomatic conference indicate that member States may comply with the making available
right either through local communication rights, or through a combination of rights, including the right to distribute
copies, as the United States urged during the drafting period. (1996 Records at 675, para 301.) For extensive
discussion of the “umbrella solution,” by the coiner of the term, see; Mihaly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the
Internet (Oxford 2002) at 204-09, 496-509.
5
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998) (“The treaties do not require any change in the substance of copyright
rights or exceptions in U.S. law.”)
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on the scope of the distribution right and predate the recent academic scholarship . . .
reviewing previously unanalyzed legislative history.6
A. “Making available” and the distribution right
The Green Paper’s hopeful coda (“All of these cases, however, have focused solely on
the scope of the distribution right and predate the recent academic scholarship described above,
reviewing previously unanalyzed legislative history”) signals the problem: U.S. courts have
inconsistently interpreted the scope of the distribution right. The Green Paper’s hint to courts to
heed academic commentators’ exploration of legislative history reveals the U.S.
Administration’s fear that its uncertain caselaw may be putting the U.S. out of step with
international norms.
The U.S. encounters the danger of insufficient international compliance even though it
has long been recognized in the U.S., as a matter of statute and caselaw, that the exclusive right
to distribute the work in copies or phonorecords (17 U.S.C. sec. 106(3)) applies to digital files as
well as to material copies.7 But, as the “Green Paper” acknowledges, and as discussed in the
October 2008 Letter from the U.S.,8 the authorities are inconsistent as to whether the distribution
right extends both to offers as well as to actual deliveries of digital copies. For the moment, only
federal district courts have ruled on the question, but their rulings have ranged from simply
asserting that the distribution right includes a making available right,9 to assimilating making
available to “publication” (whose statutory definition encompasses offers to distribute),10 to
requiring actual downloads.11 The last group of decisions thus leaves a gap in U.S. coverage of
the full range of the making available right.
B. “Making available” and the public performance right

6

U.S. Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the
Digital Economy (July 2013) [“Green Paper”] pp. 14-16 (footnotes omitted). The recent scholarship referred to
includes, Peter Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age,
59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 1 (2011).
7
See, e.g., in addition to the sources cited in the “Green Paper,” 17 U.S.C. sec 115(a) (“digital phonorecord
delivery”); 115(c)(3)(A) (“compulsory licensee to distribute or authorize the distribution of a phonorecord of a
nondramatic musical work by means of a digital transmission which constitutes a digital phonorecord delivery” –
emphasis supplied).
8
Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?,
218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167 (October 2008).
9
See, e.g., A&M Records v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster”); Universal City Studios
Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D. Me. 2006); Motown Records Co. v. DiPietro, No. 04-CV2246, 2007 WL 576284 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, Civil No. 07-3705, 2009 WL
3152153, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009).
10
Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F.Supp. 2d 234 (2008).
11
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008); London-Sire Records, Inc. v.
Doe 1,542 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008) (but presuming that an actual download occurred); Atl. Recording
Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981-84 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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Further doubt regarding the U.S.’ compliance with its international obligations arose
from some federal courts,’ particularly the Second Circuit’s, removal of certain on-demand
transmissions from the scope of the public performance right. The 1976 Act’s definition of “to
perform publicly" in fact was drafted in anticipation of consumer-initiated transmissions of
performances. The text specifies that one performs “publicly”:
by transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . to
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.12
This provision, known as the ‘transmit clause’, generally applies to electronic transmissions. To
“transmit” a performance or display of the work is defined as meaning “to communicate it by
any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they
are sent.” “Devices” and “processes” expressly include those that were developed after the law
came into effect.13
1. The Second Circuit’s threat to U.S. compliance with the WIPO Treaties’
“making available” right
In 2008, in Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings (“Cablevision”),14 discussed in the October
2008 Letter from the US,15 the Second Circuit nonetheless ruled that a remote video recording
service’s on-demand transmissions made from “personalized” copies initially delivered by the
service to its customers’ individualized cloud storage boxes did not violate the public
performance right on the ground that the subsequent one-to-one transmissions were not “to the
public” because they derived from the customer’s own copy and only that customer was “capable
of receiving” a transmission from that copy. The court also held that the service’s storage of the
personal source copies did not violate the reproduction right, on the ground that the customers,
not the service, “made” the copies residing on the service’s computers, because, given the
automated nature of the service, only the customers exercised specific “volition” as to what
content to copy. In the October 2008 Letter, I suggested that the Second Circuit’s interpretations
of the reproduction and public performance rights were likely to spawn new copyright-avoiding
12

17 U.S.C. § 101.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, 94th Cong. 2d sess. at 64 (1976)): “The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . is broad
enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless communications media, including
but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method by which the
images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission,’ and if the
transmission reaches the public in [any] form, the case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.”;
H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, 90th Cong., 1st sess. at 29 (1967): the legislation anticipates “the case of sounds or images
stored in an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual members
of the public.”.
14
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F. 3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
15
Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?,
218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167 (October 2008).
13
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business models to exploit transmissions of copyrighted works.16 Were these new modes of
offering transmissions of copyrighted works to the public to remain copyright-free, U.S.
compliance with its obligation to implement the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right would
be endangered. The subsequent Aereo controversy, ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in
June 2014,17 proved the prediction true.
In 2012, a New York City company called Aereo began a service that allowed
subscribers, for a monthly fee, to access live (or recorded) broadcast television via a Web
browser from the subscriber’s Internet-connected computer or mobile device or home video
streaming device. The service worked by allowing a subscriber to connect to a very small
antenna, located at Aereo’s data center, that received broadcast television signals. According to
Aereo’s website, “When you log in, you are assigned a miniaturized, private, remote antenna.
Once you’ve connected to your antenna, you can use the Aereo platform to access all major
broadcast networks live in HD.”18 Aereo also provided subscribers with a remote DVR service
that allowed the subscriber to record selected programming: when a subscriber chose to record a
show, his assigned antenna housed at the Aereo data center would be directed to tune to the
channel broadcasting the program and route the digital broadcast stream to his remote DVR. The
subscriber could then later choose to view the remotely recorded program on any Aereosupported device.
Television broadcasters sued Aereo alleging copyright infringement. The District Court
ruled that Cablevision controlled, and that Aereo had therefore not “publicly performed” the
television programs.19 A divided Second Circuit affirmed. The majority reiterated its view that
“the relevant inquiry under the Transmit Clause is the potential audience of a particular
transmission, not the potential audience for the underlying work or the particular performance of
that work being transmitted.”20 It also held that there were “two essential facts” which led to the
holding that Cablevision’s transmissions were not public performances: that its RS-DVR allowed
each subscriber to create unique copies of each program, and that the transmission of the
recording to a subscriber was from that unique copy.21 These features meant that “the potential
audience of every RS-DVR transmission was only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the
subscriber who created the copy,” and that limitation meant that the transmission was not “to the
public”.22 Aereo’s system had those same two features.23
The dissenting judge charged that Aereo’s technical architecture was “a sham”:
16

Id.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
18
AEREO, https://aereo.com (last visited May 27, 2014) After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Aereo Website is
no longer active.
19
874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
20
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 691 (2d Cir. 2013).
21
Id. at 689.
22
Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
23
Id. at 690.
17
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The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than
one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, overengineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of
a perceived loophole in the law. 24
Rejecting the contention that, to hold that Aereo’s transmissions were not public
performances would be to “exalt[] form over substance, because the Aereo system is functionally
equivalent to a cable television provider,”25 the majority nonetheless rejoined, ‘”[T]hat Aereo
was able to design a system based on Cablevision’s holding to provide its users with nearly live
television over the internet is an argument that Cablevision was wrongly decided; it does not
provide a basis for distinguishing Cablevision.”26 The majority noted that many other technology
providers, particularly cloud computing services, had also designed their systems around
Cablevision’s holdings. “Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the
technical details of a particular system and more on its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . .
. held that technical architecture matters.”27 Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish
between public and private transmissions than when Congress enacted the transmit clause in
1976, the majority ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as previously interpreted in
Cablevision, dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions were not public performances.28
The Supreme Court reversed.29 A 6-3 majority (Breyer, joined by Roberts, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) held that Aereo was “performing” the broadcast programming
when the service captured the programming through the users’ individually-assigned antennas,
then digitized, momentarily stored in individualized copies and retransmitted the programming to
its subscribers at their request.30 The majority also ruled that the performances were “to the
public” notwithstanding each transmission’s origin in a separate subscriber-assigned copy. The
majority emphasized Aereo’s resemblance to cable retransmission operators, a service Congress
in the 1976 Copyright Act unambiguously brought within the scope of the exclusive right of
public performance.31 Although the majority distinguished less cable-like transmission services,
notably “cloud storage” models such as Dropbox, and RS-DVR services, it declined to elaborate
on the implications of its holdings for these other kinds of internet-based enterprises.32 Finally,
the majority posited that in appropriate cases, even if the service is deemed to be “publicly
performing” third party content, the fair use doctrine might excuse the transmission.33 The
24

WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting).
Id.
26
Id. at 694.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 695.
29
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
30
Id. at 2506.
31
Id. at 2506, 2509.
32
Id. at 2511.
33
Id.
25
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dissenters (Scalia, joined by Thomas and Alito) did not address the “public” character of the
performance because they contended that Aereo lacked sufficient volition to be “performing” the
programming.34 The dissenters distinguished video on-demand services, who exercise volition
in the selection of content offered to consumers, from automated retransmission services, which
simply relay an upstream transmission entity’s (in this case, the broadcasters’) selection of
programming proposed to users.35
2. Implications of the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision for U.S. compliance with the
WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right
In assessing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion on the state of U.S.
compliance with the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right, I focus on four issues:
a. coverage of a-synchronous transmissions (in accordance with the treaties’ specification that
the right cover the possibility for members of the public to access works “from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them”);
b. identification of “the public” and “members of the public” consistently with their meaning in
the WIPO Treaties;
c. interpretation of the public performance right in a way that does not limit the right to actual
transmissions, but instead encompasses offers to transmit performances of works;
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public performance and
reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such prerequisite with international norms.

a. A-synchronicity
The Aereo decision clearly establishes that communications to the public comprehended
within the 1976 Copyright Act’s public performance rights36 may be a-synchronous. The
“transmit clause” of the U.S. Copyright Act defines “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’”
in relevant part as:
by transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . to
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.37

34

Id. at 2514.
Id. at 2513.
36
17 U.S.C. sec. 106(4) and (6), (and, implicitly, the sec. 106(5) public display right).
37
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, current through P.L. 113-66) (emphasis supplied).
35
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The Second Circuit in Aereo had understood the “it” in the Transmit Clause to mean the
particular transmission communicated to the recipient, and in the case of individualized
transmissions, had held that because only one person was “capable of receiving” that
transmission, the performance was not “public.” Rejecting this reading, the Supreme Court
clarified that the object of the right was the performance of the work, not a particular
transmission of a performance, and ruled that
[A]n entity may transmit a performance through one or several transmissions, where the
performance is of the same work. That is because one can "transmit" or "communicate"
something through a set of actions. Thus one can transmit a message to one's friends,
irrespective of whether one sends separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single email to all at once. So can an elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to
her constituents, regardless of whether she communicates that idea, slogan, or speech
during individual phone calls to each constituent or in a public square.
The fact that a singular noun ("a performance") follows the words "to transmit"
does not suggest the contrary. One can sing a song to his family, whether he sings the
same song one-on-one or in front of all together. Similarly, one's colleagues may watch a
performance of a particular play--say, this season's modern-dress version of "Measure for
Measure"--whether they do so at separate or at the same showings. By the same principle,
an entity may transmit a performance through one or several transmissions, where the
performance is of the same work.
The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for it provides that one may
transmit a performance to the public “whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at the same time or at different times.” §101.
Were the words “to transmit . . . a performance” limited to a single act of communication,
members of the public could not receive the performance communicated “at different
times.” Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we conclude that when
an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to
multiple people, it transmits a performance to them regardless of the number of discrete
communications it makes. . . . So whether Aereo transmits from the same or separate
copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same
sounds. Therefore, when Aereo streams the same television program to multiple
subscribers, it “transmit[s] . . . a performance” to all of them.38
To stick with Shakespeare (albeit in paraphrase), the “work’s the thing”: not the temporal
coincidence of its performances. The Supreme Court therefore has corrected a significant error
in the Second Circuit’s construction of the “transmit clause,” an error which, had it persisted,

38

American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., --- U.S. --- 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014) (emphasis in third
paragraph supplied).
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would have placed the U.S. out of compliance with respect to on-demand communications,
where transmissions would inevitably occur at different times.
b. “The public”
i. Meaning of “the public” in the Berne Convention and the WCT
The Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaty mandate protection for two kinds of
public communications of works: performances in public, and “communication” of the work to
the public by transmission. The first kind, covered in Berne Convention articles 11, 11ter, 14
and 14bis, concerns performances in places open to the public; the public is present at these
performances and therefore apprehends them directly. The second kind, “communication to the
public,” provided-for in the cited Berne Convention articles as well as in Berne Convention art.
11bis and WCT art 8 and WPPT arts. 10 and 14, reaches members of the public through the
intermediary of any manner of wired or wireless transmission. Neither Convention defines “the
public.” But the concept implies its opposite: some performances or communications by
transmission will be “private” in nature. The “private” quality of the performance or
communication may be ascertained by the size of the potential audience; if only an insubstantial
number of persons have the opportunity to attend the performance in person (public
performance) or to receive it via transmission (communication to the public), the Berne
Convention and WCT rights are not engaged.
It is important to emphasize “potential” audience: a performance in a place open to the
public is a public performance, even if an insubstantial number of people in fact attend.
Similarly, a transmission offered to the public at large does not become “private” if only a few
members of the public in fact receive (or watch or listen to) it.39 The WCT “gives greater
indication than does the Berne Convention that the relevant ‘public’ is comprised of ‘members’,
and, accordingly, need not be populous, although the greater the numbers to whom a work is
made available, the more apparent the conclusion that the making available was to ‘the public’.
But simply offering the work on an undiscriminating basis, so that a member of the public may
access the work, should come within the scope of the right. Even more restricted offers, such as
to all university students, or to all aficionados of obscure Australian or Estonian poetry, appeal to
an audience potentially too large for a ‘family circle’ or similar exclusion.”40 Put another way,
different kinds of works may have different “publics;” the potential audience for a Hollywood
action film may be far greater than the potential audience for a European “art” film (in which
nothing happens), but both are directed toward persons whose only relationship to the copyright
owner and to each other is their predilection for that type of work.
39

Accord, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (an infringer communicates a performance to the public, whether or
not the “members of the public capable of receiving” it are “operating [their] receiving apparatus at the time of the
transmission”).
40
Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights: The Berne Convention and
Beyond, para. 12.58 (2006).

11

The Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaties leave to member states the precise
demarcation of the line between public and private communications. For example, member states
may exclude from the scope of the right performances or communications to a “family circle,”41
or enlarge the “private” zone to cover not only family but also its “social acquaintance,”42 or
define “the public” to mean “an indeterminate number of potential recipients [which] implies,
moreover, a fairly large number of persons.”43 But wherever a member state sets the dividing
line, one may infer that the “public” character of a communication turns on the opportunity for a
substantial number of unrelated persons to receive the work being communicated.
Commercial benefit furnishes another dividing line between public and private
communications: if members of the public are invited to pay to receive the communication, it is
unlikely to be private in nature.44 But one should beware the negative inference: it does not
follow that a not-for-profit communication is therefore not “to the public;” many non
commercial performances nonetheless are amply “public.”45 Rather, the commercial nature of
the performance is a one-way street, furnishing an indicium of the “public” character of the
communication, but not concomitantly permitting a characterization of a non commercial
communication as not “to the public.”
ii. The meaning of “the public” in Aereo
The Supreme Court in Aereo elaborated on the meaning of a performance “to the public.”
The Court emphasized that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle.”46 The Court
distinguished Aereo, which it viewed as akin to a traditional cable television retransmission
service, from “an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities as owners
or possessors”; such a service “does not perform to ‘the public,’ whereas an entity like Aereo
41
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that transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the
works does so perform.”47
The Court’s reference to “owners or possessors” is, at best, very imprecise; the service’s
customer is unlikely to be an owner of “the work” because “the work” is the incorporeal object
whose “owner” is the author or other copyright owner. Presumably, based on the submissions by
the amicus curiae briefs, including the United States’, the Court was positing the request by a
customer of a remote storage service to play back a digital copy that she was entitled, by express
or implied license, or under the fair use doctrine, to deposit in a digital storage locker. In that
event, even if multiple customers separately stored the same content with the service, the latter’s
subsequent on-demand play back of performances of the same work to those customers would
not be a transmission to “the public” by the service or the customer: “[T]he term ‘the public’ . . .
does not extend to those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product.”48 “Product”
in this context apparently includes a license to access the stored content. When a digital storage
service plays content acquired and stored by customers back to those customers, then, there is no
public performance.
However, in addition to the customer’s entitlement of access (which the Court treated as
a possessory relationship) to the customer-stored content, the Court introduced a further
consideration: “And we have not considered whether the public performance right is infringed
when the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of
copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content.”49 The Court appears to be focusing
on the nature of the commercial relationship between the customer and the service. Remote
storage services are transmitting content to members of the public (their subscribers) when they
play back the files requested by the users.50 Unlike pay (or listen)-on-demand, however, the
service for which the members of the public are paying is not the opportunity to receive
transmissions of performances of particular works offered by the service, but rather to store
whatever content the users post, whatever its source, and make it accessible remotely. The
customers pay the same subscription fees whatever the content they store and access. Thus,
while there is a public that pays in dollars or in subjection to advertising51 (or other costs of
“free” commercial services), the public is not specifically paying for transmissions of
performances of any given copyrighted works.
47
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Whether a service is performing “publicly,” then, appears to turn on the nature of the
service for which customers are paying. The service’s customers are certainly members of the
public, but the same act by the service – transmitting a performance of a given work – may or
may not be a public performance depending on the existence of some kind of possessory
relationship between the individual members of the public and a copy of or a license to use the
content, and depending on whether the service is primarily offering streaming access to specified
copyrighted works.
iii. Consistency with international norms
A reformulation of the Court’s statement that “an entity does not transmit to the public if
it does not transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle,”52
as an affirmative assertion – that an entity that transmits [a performance of a work] to a
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle is publicly performing the
work – seems to conform to international norms. But if the “public” character of a transmission
of a performance also depends on the relationship of the customer of the transmission entity to
the copyrighted work (owner of a copy; licensee of an access right), is this gloss also consistent
with international norms? As discussed above, the treaties permit certain inferences concerning
the size and nature of a communication’s potential audience, but do not introduce distinctions
based on any possessory relationship of the members of the public to the content of the work.
That said, the inquiry into the nature of the service implied by the Court’s attention to the kind of
service (storage v. transmission of particular works) for which the members of the public who
constitute its customers are paying is not necessarily inconsistent with international norms.
To ask whether the service is offering to transmit performances of particular copyrighted
works to members of the public, or whether these transmissions instead are ancillary to some
other service (storage) that does not trigger the right of communication to the public (though it
may implicate the right of reproduction), is to focus on the economic dimension of the
communication. The above-cited articles of the Berne Convention and the WCT all concern
exploitations of the work; they confer on the author the exclusive rights to authorize various
kinds of exploitations (or, in the case of art. 11bis(2), the right to be remunerated for certain
retransmissions). It may follow that “the public” should correspond to “the group which the
copyright owner would otherwise contemplate as its public for the performance of its work.”53
Arguably, the essence of a performance “to the public” is that it is occurring in circumstances
where the owner is entitled to expect payment for the work’s authorized performance because the
performing entity is exploiting the work.54 In Aereo, the Court’s emphasis on the resemblance
between Aereo’s retransmission service and a traditional cable television retransmission service
52
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reflects a determination that if the Copyright Act entitles broadcasters to payment for cable
retransmission, then broadcasters are also entitled to payment for cable-like retransmissions. By
contrast, copyright owners are not entitled to expect payment when members of the public view
legitimately-acquired copies of films at home; arguably it should make no difference whether the
home-viewed copy is stored at home, or stored remotely.
Thus, the Court’s focus on a possessory relationship between the member of the public
and the source copy for the transmission enjoys some support as a matter of construction of the
right of communication to the public in the Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaties.
Nonetheless, the analysis is problematic because it appears to make the public character of a
work turn on a prior analysis of infringement: if the author is entitled to control the exploitation,
then a third party’s exploitation is “to the public,” but if the author is not entitled to expect
payment, then the communication is not to the public. As a result, the question of the prima
facie application of exclusive rights may become improperly conflated with the question of
copyright exceptions. But as section 110 of the Copyright Act demonstrates, a communication,
for example in the course of online education, may be a “public performance” yet be subject to a
narrow exemption from liability. For example, if the TEACH Act exceptions in section 110(2)
apply, the copyright holder is not entitled to expect payment, but there is no question that the
transmissions are to (a defined segment of) the public. Aereo itself did not invite this confusion
of the public character of a performance with liability for infringement, but if one is to
understand the Court’s attention to the nature of the service as implying a distinction between
uses that the copyright owner may control (because, for want of a better term, they “feel” like
they belong in the public performance camp) and uses that the copyright owner may not (because
they “feel” like acts transpiring in private), then it becomes important to bear in mind that a
communication can be “to the public” even if, by virtue of an exception, it falls outside the
copyright owner’s rights.
c. Actual transmissions or offers to transmit
The Aereo opinion construes the Transmit Clause component of the definition of “to
perform publicly” in a way which often appears to assume that actual transmissions have
occurred (as was the case with the Aereo service). It does not, however, therefore follow that the
Court has excluded offers to transmit from the scope of the statutory exclusive right. First, while
the Court emphasized that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle,”55 it elsewhere equated
Aereo’s offering of its service to an infringement of the public performance right. Hence: “We
must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of public
performance] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to
watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast
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over the air. We conclude that it does.”56 What triggers the infringement is the “selling” of a
service that “allows” subscribers to view the programs; the court does not require that a
subscriber consummate the infringement by viewing an actual transmission.
Second, as the following analysis shows, the Court’s statements make sense only if the
scope of the right includes offers to transmit performances of works. If one disregards the
Court’s characterization of the infringement as occurring “by selling” a service that “allows” its
subscribers to view live television, and instead takes literally the Court’s statement that “an
entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit . . .”, it would follow there is no
transmission to “the public” if the service does not in fact communicate the performance of the
work to a substantial number of people. But therefore to characterize the communication as
“private” is questionable: if performances of a work are offered to the public, for example, on a
pay-per-view basis, the characterization of the performances as “to the public” should not turn on
how many members of the public accept the offer and in fact request a transmission of the
performance. If one were to understand the Court’s statement as meaning actual, rather than
offered, transmissions, then the "public" nature of a performance could not be ascertained
without post-hoc head-counting. Not only does such an interpretation introduce uncertainty for
copyright owners and exploiters alike, but it promotes the kinds of baroque copyright-avoiding
business models the Court discredited. Given the Copyright Act’s inclusion in the public
performance right of discrete transmissions to the public that are separated in time, were only
actual transmissions to trigger the public performance right, then the service might be permitted
to make an "insubstantial" number of transmissions to paying subscribers before the number of
transmissions tipped over into communicating the performance of the work to a "substantial"
number of unrelated persons. If the service is in effect allowed up to, say, fifty “free”
transmissions, then one might imagine the creation of a plethora of separately constituted
subsidiary services each catering to no more than fifty members of the public. But if such a
scenario seems unlikely to “fool” any trial judge as to the nature of the service, that is because
we sense that a judge, aware of the Supreme Court’s rejection of Aereo’s attempt to render
“private” the communications Aereo offered to the public at large, would focus on the offer to
transmit, rather than on the actual communication of a transmission.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court conflated the two kinds of “public” in the
statutory definition of “to perform publicly” – performance in public (where a substantial
number of persons other than a circle of family and its social acquaintance is gathered);
performance by transmission to the public – the Transmit Clause does not in fact require that the
“members of the public” capable of receiving the transmission of the performance be numerous.
Indeed, what matters, in determining whether the audience for a transmission is “the public,” is
56
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capacity by “members of the public” to receive the transmission, not actual receipt.57 Those
who are “capable of receiving” the performance by transmission are those to whom the
transmission is offered. Under this reading, the offer of streaming access triggers the public
performance right; it is not necessary to await actual transmission, even to one member of the
public, to ascertain if the right has been engaged.
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public performance and
reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such prerequisite with international norms.
The Second Circuit’s introduction in Cablevision of a “volition” prerequisite to the act of
reproduction, and its extension to the act of public performance advocated by Aereo, Inc. and the
Supreme Court dissenters, could prove a significant impediment to U.S. implementation of the
making available right. The right is in many respects user-focused because it targets on-demand
communications. Unlike traditional “push” technologies, in which the copyright owner or
licensee determines when to disseminate the content, the “pull” technologies that exploit the
making available right enable the consumer to select what content she wishes, and where and
when to receive it. If a “volition” predicate were to mean that the exploiter is not making a work
available because the exploiter merely responds automatically to the end-user’s choice of what,
when and where to receive the communication of a copyrighted work, then the “making
available” right would collapse. By the same token, a determination that an online service does
not “make” the copy that it offers to deliver to or store for the consumer on her request, or that it
does not “perform” the offered work because the consumer decided which of the offered works
she wanted transmitted to her at a place (or device) and time selected by her, eviscerates the
utility of the reproduction and public performance rights to effecutate the making available right.
To assess the U.S. post-Aereo compliance with international norms, it therefore is necessary to
inquire into the current status of any “volition” predicate to the determination whether the
defendant has engaged in a copyright-triggering act.
i. Aereo’s treatment of volition as a predicate to application of the public
performance right
The Aereo majority’s silence on the matter of “volition” in the face of the dissenters’
emphatic interpolation of a “volition” predicate might suggest that the majority considers
“volition” irrelevant to the assessment of whether the defendant has publicly performed a work.
The majority’s analysis of whether Aereo “perform[s] at all” 58 distinguishes between the mere
provision of equipment and “engag[ing] in activities like Aereo’s.”59 The majority underscored
Congress’ rejection in the 1976 Act of the Court’s Fortnightly60 and Teleprompter61 precedents,
57
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in which the Court had held that traditional cable television retransmission services were merely
providing equipment that the customers might themselves have installed (given the Court’s
rather fanciful evocation of the customers’ acts, such as placing an aerial on a mountaintop and
stringing a wire from the mountaintop to the customer’s home), and not “performing” the works
that the services retransmitted to their customers. According to Aereo, a service “performs”
copyrighted works, rather than simply supplying equipment, when it “uses its own equipment,
housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes,” to transmit performances of
works to viewers, even when that equipment “may . . . emulate equipment a viewer could use at
home.” 62 The majority therefore appears to stress the service’s active engagement in the
transmission, rather than any specific “volition” with respect to the particular content
transmitted.
Indeed, the majority’s rejection of the dissent’s characterization of Aereo’s service as “a
copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card,”63 underscores the irrelevance of the
customer’s selection of which programming to watch to the determination of whether the service
has “performed” the works it transmits. The court also declined to attribute any significance to
the additional layer of consumer intervention involved in Aereo’s system relative to cable
systems: while cable systems retransmit sua sponte, Aereo does not activate the subscriber’s
antenna without the subscriber’s request. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, the Court
announced that “this difference means nothing to the subscriber. It means nothing to the
broadcaster.” 64
Nonetheless, the Court did not completely discount the role of the user in the
determination of “who performs” a work: “a user’s involvement in the operation of the
provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on whether the
provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”65 This statement is a far cry from adopting
the kind of “volition” predicate urged by the dissent (or, for that matter, by the Second Circuit in
Cablevision), but it nonetheless suggests that when the service is less “cable-like” than Aereo,
the majority’s distinction between providing the equipment that enables a performance, and
actually “performing” remains uncertain.
In any event, it should be clear, even under the dissent’s characterization, that specific
“volition” as to the transmission of particular content is not required for the communication to be
considered a “public performance.” All Justices agree that video on demand services are
“performing,” and it should not matter how automated the process: once the service assembles
61
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the selection of the programs from which the consumer may choose and then offers them
commercially to the public, the service has gone beyond merely providing transmission facilities.
For the majority, cable and cable-like services still “perform” even though they did not originate
the selection of programming offered to the users (the broadcasters did, though the cable
operators select the source broadcast stations whose content they retransmit), and even though
the users ultimately choose which programs to watch, by turning a knob on the television, or
clicking on a website. (Of course, the last feature of user involvement is common to on-demand
transmissions, too.) If on-demand services occupy one end of the “who performs” continuum,
and cable-like services stand at an intermediate – but still “performing” – point, some services
that offer remote storage (but are entirely agnostic as to the content users store) might be located
at the other end.
ii. “Volition” and the reproduction right
There is another reason to interpret Aereo as blunting the pertinence of a “volition”
prerequisite to copyright-triggering acts. While Aereo addressed only the public performance
right, the “volition” analysis, as derived from the Second Circuit’s Cablevision decision,
threatens significantly to curtail the effectiveness of the reproduction right as well. Indeed, if
one reads Aereo to have no purchase on the reproduction right, the opportunities for eluding the
import of the Supreme Court’s decision are readily apparent. Suppose that instead of
retransmitting programming in approximately real time, an Aereo-like service, responding
automatically to user demand, recorded the entirety of a broadcast program and then transmitted
the file to the user to be viewed or heard only following (and not simultaneously with) the
download of the file. Aereo specified that “to transmit a performance of (at least) an audiovisual
work means to communicate contemporaneously visible images and contemporaneously audible
sounds of the work.”66 And the Court cited with approval the Second Circuit decision that
declined to characterize a transmission in the nature of a download as a “performance.”67
In this scenario, there is no public performance, because the service is not transmitting a
performance, it is distributing a copy. (In a more elaborate version of the scenario, the service
would record and transmit the programming in 10-minute increments, so that the user can watch
the program only 10 minutes after “real time.”) Except that, if the Cablevision “volition”
predicate pertains, the copyright-implicating actor would not be the service, it would be the user.
(On-demand services that deliver non contemporaneously perceptible files which the users
choose from among a collection of works assembled by the service presumably should satisfy
any “volition” requirement on the part of the service.) The Aereo Court declined to project the
effect of its decision on remote time-shifting services, but one may query whether the posited
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service is offering “time-shifting” (which may or may not be a public performance) or another
Rube Goldberg-like work-around the public performance right.68
iii. Volition and other iterations of the reproduction and public
performance rights: Does an RS-DVR service make works available
within the meaning of the WIPO Copyright Treaties?
Aereo avoided ruling on whether RS-DVR services were “publicly performing” the
works they retransmitted, but the question remains whether the Cablevision precedent, if its
volition analysis is in any respect still good law, places the U.S. in tension with its obligation to
implement the making available right. If the activities of services like Cablevision and Aereo (in
its time-shifting incarnation) are considered to make available the content of the copied and
retransmitted works within the meaning of the WIPO Treaties, then the U.S. should not (for nonUS works) be free to exclude those services from the reach of the public performance and
reproduction rights. RS-DVR services, through a two-step process of transmission on demand,
arguably engage in two series of acts covered by the making available right, first by
communicating a copy of the work to the user’s storage device, and subsequently by transmitting
it to the user for contemporaneous viewing.
Several foreign authorities interpreting national or EU norms, have ruled that the services
“make” the copies (thus violating the reproduction right)69 and/or make the works available to
their subscribers.70 The EU Information Society Directive has implemented the WIPO Treaties’
making available right verbatim, see art. 3; EU judicial and administrative interpretations and the
interpretations of member state courts therefore are probative of the application of the making
available right to RS-DVR services, but cannot yet be said to constitute controlling “state
practice” within the meaning of art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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The WIPO Treaties may therefore allow member states some leeway in determining who
is the “maker” of a copy, or the “performer” of a work; a “volition” predicate may not always be
inconsistent with the U.S.’ international obligations. Conformity with international norms may
depend on the degree of specificity of any “volition” requirement. For example, while a
Cablevision-style volition predicate that requires specific agency as to each work transmitted
may effectively eviscerate the making available right, a volition predicate that looked to the
operation and economic impact of the service as a whole might not violate the U.S.’ obligations.
The Aereo decision’s reference to a possessory relationship between the user and a copy
of the work as a basis for distinguishing remote storage (and perhaps RS-DVR) services offers
another means to reconcile an absence of copyright liability with international norms. If the user
was lawfully entitled to store a copy on the service’s facilities (and the service did not initially
offer the content to the user), then the service’s mere retransmission of a performance of the
work from that copy might be deemed to come within the Agreed Statement to WCT art. 8’s
exclusion on the ground that “the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a
communication does not in itself amount to communication.”
In summary, the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision alleviates some concerns about the
conformity of U.S. copyright law with international norms, but the limited scope of the decision
allows other shortcomings to persist. Thus, the court has reaffirmed the reach of the public
performance right with respect to:
near-real time individualized digital retransmissions to members of the public of
broadcast content (akin to cable retransmissions);
a-synchronous transmissions to members of the public when the primary value of the
service to its customers is to transmit performances of content the customers did not
themselves store with the service, or regarding which the customers did not enjoy some
possessory relationship to a copy or right to access
Although the Court did not expressly state that the public performance right encompassed offers
to transmit performances as well as actual performances, the logic of the decision points toward
the broader (and internationally harmonious) interpretation.
The majority did not apply a specific “volition” predicate to determine whether a retransmission
service “performs” the content it communicates, but it acknowledged the possibility that in some
instances the end-user might be deemed the “performer.”
The Court has not directly spoken to the following issues:
Whether remote storage services are publicly performing content stored at the direction
of their customers (but the opinion strongly suggests those services are not publicly
performing);
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Whether “volition” is a predicate to determine whether a remote storage service “makes”
the consumer-requested copies created and retained on its servers;
Perhaps most importantly, because Aereo concerned only the public performance right, the Court
did not have occasion to address whether the distribution right encompasses offers to distribute
digital copies, or is limited to actual distributions of digital copies. As a result, the greatest gap
in U.S. compliance with its international obligation to implement the “making available” right
remains unremediated.
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